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AN  EVALUATION  OF THE  1981  FARM  PROGRAM  FOR  CROPS:
IMPLICATIONS  FOR  THE  1985  FARM  BILL
Abner W.  Womack,  Stanley  R.  Johnson,  William  H.  Meyers,  and Robert Young,  II
The cornerstone  of the  1977  and  1981  Farm  impacts that should not occur under the efficient
Bills for crops  is a buffer  stock-supply manage-  operation  of a  supply management  strategy.
ment  program  involving  the  farmer-owned  re-
serve  and  acreage  adjustment  instruments.  GRAIN  MANAGEMENT  PROGRAMS
Among  the  several  reasons  normally  cited  for
adopting this type program is price and  income  As  indicated  by Burntein  in reviewing  the
stability. However,  recent swings in commodity  1977 Farm Bill, major reasons for implementing
prices,  net  farm  income  and  government  pro-  the reserve program were to (1) moderate  mar-
gram costs  have stimulated  widespread interest  ket  instability,  (2)  maintain  reasonable  price
in  farm  program  redesign  and  modification  in  levels  for  producers  and  consumers,  and  (3)
1985.  Before  joining  this  chorus,  it  may  be  provide  reliable  supplies for domestic  and for-
worthwhile  to  reexamine  the operation  of this  eign  markets. It was implicitly assumed that the
supply management program to discern the fea-  managed buffer stocks would be  more effective
sibility  of  this  type  of  design  in  the  current  i  producing  these results than the free market,
economic-political  environment.  In order to ac-  r that the free  market  would  be  less  efficient
complish  this objective, an econometric  model  i  assuring reserve  levels necessary  to produce
of the U.S.  crops - livestock sector was utilized.  these  results.
Four program  designs were  simulated  over the  Implicit in these  criteria  is the notion of the
crop years  1970 through  1979, which included  value  of  price  stabilization,  since  the  buffer
periods  of scarcity  and surplus.  These  options  stock system addresses price stabilization  as op-
employ  the supply  management  program with  posed  to price  support.  It  is  often  argued  that
four  alternative  management  strategies,  some  price  stability  for agricultural  producers  leads
relying more  heavily  on acreage  reduction  and  to  greater  efficiency  (Hallett,  Houck).  Also,  re-
others  on  the  reserve  program.  Conclusions  serves  in  lean years  reduce  the danger  of food
drawn from these program simulations serve  as  shortage.  This,  in  turn,  reduces  sharp  price
a  focal  point  for  evaluating  the  1982-83  Re-  changes  for  grain  inputs  to  the  livestock  and
duced  Acreage  Program  and  the  Payment-In-  food grain sectors,  resulting in less erratic price
Kind Program  in  1983-84.  changes  at the retail market.  Thus,  stabilization
has  a  dual  focus, price  protection  for the pro-
In general these  results indicate that the sup-  ducer and the consumer.  Major  questions for a
ply  management  program  can  be  balanced  or  managed reserve  program  are the price band to
imbalanced  depending  upon  the  set  of  man-  be used in  its operation and  the level  of stocks
agement rules that are followed.  By implication,  required to assure that prices within  the range
consistent  adherence  to the  management  rules  can be maintained at minimum government cost.
over time  is  desirable  unless  there  is  evidence
of imbalance. A conclusion  of this paper is  that  The  1977  Farm Program for  Wheat and
the  significant  players  in  the  political  process  Feedgrains
of management  and operation  (Administration,
Congress,  and  Budget)  did  not  reach  compro-  The  1977  Farm Bill adopted  by the Congress
mises on program design in  1982-83  and 1983-  combined  a  modified  buffer  stock  program
84  that  conform  to  a balanced  set of rules.  As  (farmer  owned  reserve)  with  an  acreage  ad-
a  result,  the  industry  has  been  subjected  to  justment  program.  While  price  corridors  and
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27Price  measures  were taken  to reduce reserves,  loans
3.26  Call  price
3.26  Call priceppy  had to  be  repaid within  90  days.
Supply
2.81  Release  price  Inter-Year Rules  (Acreage  Adjustment)
A second facet of the program  was  the inter-
•••••--  "..  ---------  --- "Desired"- - year  rules  available  to maintain  the  price  cor-
2.35  Target  ridor. In.simplest  terms,  this is  a land manage-
ment  program.  Future  supply  and  demand,
2.25  /  \Loan  including  stock  level  objectives,  are  assessed
Demand  relative  to  the  desired  price  in  the  center  of
Quantity  the  corridor.  Acreage  forecast  with  expected
Expected  supply  and demand  yield  generates  an  expected  supply  without  a
set-aside.  If this  exercise  indicates  strong  sup-
Figure 1.  Corn: Program variables associated with the  plies  relative  to  demand-price  for  the  next plies  relative  to  demand-price  for  the  next
1977 farm  bill,  1980-81.
year at the bottom of the corridor-then a set-
aside  program  is  instituted.  An  assessment  of
this  type  resulted  in  a  set-aside  for  feedgrains
and wheat in 1978-79,1979-80,1982-83,1983- reserve  objectives  were  set,  significant  modifi-  and  198-9  199-8  198-8 84  and  1984-85  crop  years.
cations to the simple  concept  of a  buffer stock  Alternatively,  if proected  demand  is  strong Alternatively,  if  projected  demand  is  strong
system should be noted. Instead of a single price  ces in the
band,  this  program  contained  several  trigger ,  this  p  m  c  aind  s  l  tig  next year above some predetermined price range
prices, as depicted in Figure  1. Specific program  with anticipated stock below program level ob-
rules controlling these prices can be best under-  jectives  a set-asideis not institute.  This set of
stood by dividing into inter- and intra-year sets.  circumstances  led to a no-set-aside decision for
feedgrain  and wheat in the  1980-81  and  1981-
82  crop years.
Intra-Year Rules  (Reserve)  82  crop  years. It should  be  noted  that a  very  crucial  facet
of  this  program  strategy  is  the  necessity  for
The  program  was designed to operate  so that  forward  supply  and  utilization  estimates  con-
the expected price in a "good crop" year would  ditioned  on a  forward  price objective.
remain  between  the  loan  and  release  price  a
high percentage of the time. In short crop years,  The  81  arm Program for  Feedgrains
the  price  would  remain  between  the  release  and  Wheat
and the call price a high percentage of the time.
In  years with  large  crops,  the  price would  be  The  1981  farm  program  for  feedgrains  and
maintained  between  the  loan  and the  desired  wheat was a modification of the  1977 program.
price.  To maintain  this price  corridor,  a set  of  A  significant  feature  of  the  1981  Farm  Bill  as
within  or intra-year  incentives were utilized  to  proposed  by the  administration  was  centered
manipulate  the  reserve  level.  If,  for example,  around  reserve  operation  and  elimination  of
supply was strong relative  to demand,  implying  target  prices.  The  ensuing  legislation  resulted
an  equilibrium  price  below  the  loan,  reserve  in  a mandatory  sequence  of target prices with
placements  were  induced  to  a  level  sufficient  higher  maximums  for  farmer-owned  reserves,
to at least support the loan price.  The  reserves  which was mandatory for feedgrains and wheat.
scheme  involved  farmers  holding  grain  rather  Also, the bill gave discretionary authority to the
than direct government purchases. Farmers who  Secretary for setting release prices.  Specifically,
had  participated  in  government  programs  (in  the release-call  price  mechanism  was replaced
set-aside  years)  or  complied with  normal  crop  by a single release  price with discretionary  au-
acreage  (in no-set-aside years)  had an option to  thority on setting the release.  Farmers were not
place either feedgrain or wheat into the reserve.  required to repay loans  at the release,  however
There was no such  option for soybeans,  cotton,  the  Secretary  was  given  authority  to  raise  in-
and rice.  terest  rates  and  discontinue  storage  payments.
Finally,  new maximums were set on grain flow-
To  reduce  price  in  periods  of tight  supply,  ing  into  the  reserve.  Maximums,  if set  by the
strong demand or both, economic incentives for  Secretary,  could  not  be  less  than  700  million
holding  reserve  grains  are  relaxed  at two  spe-  bushels of wheat and  1 billion bushels of feed-
cific  price  levels.  First,  when  the market  price  grain.
exceeded  the  release  price,  storage  payments  Formulas  for  loan  rates  were  modified  with
were  discontinued  and  farmers  could  market  new  specified  minimums  and  authority  to  in-
the grain without penalty. If, however,  the mar-  crease  and  decrease  below  minimums  under
ket price exceeded the call price, then stronger  certain  conditions.  Discretionary  authority was
28not given for target prices. Rather,  a prescribed  while  maintaining  the  cross-commodity
sequence  of  target  prices  were  mandated  for  linkages.  The  other  components  of the
the duration  of the  program.  Rates  of increase  model  are  the  acreage  response,  inven-
in  these  prices  have  exceeded  the  rate  of  in-  tory  functions  and  the  policy  decision
crease  in  production  cost,  resulting  in  an  im-  rules.
balanced  situation  relative  to  government  (2)  A  dynamic simulation  of the model  was
exposure  in  financing  the  program.  validated over the historical period,  tak-
The  set-aside and paid diversion program op-  ing actual  set-aside  and  reserve  policies
tions  were  maintained  in the  1981  Farm  Bill.  as  given.
A  new voluntary  acreage  control  program  was  (3)  Two  sets  of policy  decision  rules  were
added-"Acreage  Reduction."  Under this strat-  introduced  in  conjunction  with  price
egy,  acreage  limitation  was  based on a portion  corridor  objectives.  The  first set was for
of base  acreage,  which  provides  a  tighter  re-  within  year  decisions.  If,  for  example
quirement  in  acreage  reduction  for  program  market price fell below the corridor, then
compliance  compared  with  the  set-aside  pro-  reserve  stocks were accumulated  to the
vision. This strategy has been used in the  1982-  level  where  market  price  equaled  the
83 and 1983-84 crop years with no requirement  lower limit price. Alternativel  if market
for cross-compliance.  That is,  each  commodity  pric  exceeded  the  upper  limit  price
is viewed independently  of any other commod-  then  reserve  stocks  ar  placed  bak on
ity  in  regard  to  eligibility  and  provisions  for  the market until the market price equaled
program  participation. the  upper  limit  price  or  until  reserve
stocks  were  exhausted.  This  rule  was INTERACTIVE  MODEL  FOR  EVALUATING  rule  was IE  OPERACTIVE  MODEL  FOR  EVAGELUATING  designed  to  maintain  prices  within  the
F THE  BUFFER  STOCK  PROGRAM  E  corridor  whenever  possible,  i.e.,  if suf-
ficient  stocks  were  on  hand  to  protect
The  quantitative  model  used  for  evaluating  the upper limit  price.  These  rules were
alternative management strategies for the buffer  used  rather than  using the  set of instru-
stock program  has several components  (Baumes  ments  actually employed  in  the farmer-
and  Meyers,  Yanagida  and  Conway).  First,  the  owned  reserve.  Thus  the  results  apply
markets  have been  modeled  to permit  interac-  either  to  a  government  owned  reserve
tion across commodities, with linkage  to export  where  purchases  and  sales  occur  or  to
markets  and  the livestock  industry,  and supply  the current  program  where  government
response-acreage  equations  that react to market  can set provisions  to achieve reserve ob-
prices,  farm program variables,  and input costs.  jectives.
Also,  these components  have  been specified  to  The second set of policy rules involved
reflect  government  program  variables  and  cor-  inter-year rules based on estimated future
responding  operating  rules.  The  behavioral  expected  price.  If this  estimated  price
characteristics  of the model are represented  by  was  below  a  specified  acreage  trigger
the structural  price  elasticities  in Table  1.  level,  then  a  set-aside  was  adopted  for
The procedure  for developing the interactive  the following year sufficient to  raise  ex-
model in a policy mode  involved the following  pected price to the acreage  trigger.  Oth-
steps.  erwise a no-set-aside policy was adopted.
(1)  Derive the reduced-form price equations  Again,  the results using these simplified
from  the  cross-commodity  structural  rules apply to mandatory controls or vol-
model  to simplify  the  analytical  model  untary programs where  government  can
TABLE  1.  ANNUAL  ECONOMETRIC  MODEL  PRICE  ELASTICITIES  OF  DEMAND  FOR  CROPS  BY  COMPONENT,  AGGREGATE  DEMAND  ELASTICITY
WITH  1978  WEIGHTS,  AND  ACREAGE  RESPONSE  ELASTICITY"
Demand  components  (pct.  of total  demand)  Total  Demand  Acreage
Commodity  Feed  - (%)  Food  (%)  Export  (%)  Stocks  elasticity  (level)  response Commodity  Feed  M  ^  ^  ^P^  (  elasticity
Corn ...........  -. 32  (51)  -. 10  (7)  -. 19  (27)  - 1.50  (15)  -. 45  (8,187)b  .11
Sorghum  .....  -. 61  (58)  - (0)  - 2.10  (22)  -. 62  (20)  -. 94  (  939)
b .25
Barley  .........  -. 67  (33)  -. 03  (27)  b  (4)  -. 54  (36)  -. 42  (  62 9 )b  .37
Oats  ........  -. 75  (58)  -. 13  (9)  b  (1)  -. 67  (32)  -. 66  (  913)  .26
Wheat.......  -2.60  (6)  -. 03  (23)  -. 35  (40)  -. 66  (31)  -. 51  (2,977)"  .42
Soymeal  ......  .21  (72)  c  (0)  -. 60  (27)  b  (1)  -. 31  (2 4,4 6 8 )d
Soybeans  ........  (3)  - 1.26e  (51)  - 1.99  (38)  - 2.29  (8)  - 1.58  (2 ,004)  .62
a  Elasticities  from  annual  econometric  crops model,  computed  at  means  (Baumes  and  Meyers).
b Bushels
c No equation  in  model.
d 1000  short  tons.
e Crush.
29set provisions  to achieve  acreage  objec-  2.  A  farmer-owned  reserve  strategy  was  ex-
tives.  amined  where  the  government  provided
(4)  To  compare  alternative  policies  under  incentives  for farmers  to lock-up  reserve
differing market conditions, each reserve  grain  when  prices  were  low  (below  re-
policy alternative was simulated over two  lease  level) and redeem and sell the grain
historical  periods,  1971-72  - 1977-78  when  prices  were  high  (above  release
and  1974-75  - 1980-81.  The  first period  price).  The  effective  floor price  (reserve
began  and  ended  with  relatively  low  floor trigger) was set midway between the
prices and weak markets but had a strong  loan and release  levels  and the price was
market  period  in  between.  The  second  an  approximation  of  the  ceiling  price
period  began  and ended with  relatively  (ceiling  trigger).  Alternative  acreage  trig-
high  prices and  strong  markets  but had  ger levels were selected to reflect the 1977
a weak  market period  in between.  Each  program  and  modifications  suggested  by
simulation  generated  a scenario  for:  (1)  the  1981  program which reduce  reliance
acreage  diversion,  (2)  reserve  activity,  on acreage  reductions.
(3)  production,  (4)  stocks,  (5)  price,  TABLE  2.  POLICY  PROGRAM  STRATEGIES  FOR THE  INTERACTIVE
(6)  government  costs,  and  (7)  farmer-  SIMULATION  MODEL
owned  reserves.  1981
Model  Simulation  and Summary  Statistics  1977  Bill  1981  Bill  Reserve-I  Minimum
Item  Ia  Ib  IIa  IIb  IIIa  IIIb  IVa  IVb The  policy-price  simulation  model  was  con-
ditioned  by  a  set  of policy  rules  designed  to  Beginning reserve:
Corn ....... 0  1,000  0  1,000  0  1,000  0  1,000 replicate the management  strategy for the sup-  Wheat .....  0  400  0  00  0  400  00
ply management programs.  Market prices at spe-  Soybeans  .0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
cific levels imply specific  model responses. The  Acreage  trigger prices:
simulation was  initiated at  a  prescribed  begin-  Corn  .. 1.125  loan  loan  loan
ning reserve  level  plus  an  upper  bound  con-  Wheat  ..... 1.125  loan  loan  0  loan
straint on reserves. This upper bound was used  Soybeans  0  0  0  0
only in the  forward price  test to  determine  if  Reserve  floor  trigger:
acreage  diversion  was  necessary.  That  is,  if  re-  Corn  ....... 1.125  loan  1.125  loan  1.125  loan  loan
serves  exceeded  the  bound  in  a  period,  the  Wheat  .....  1.20  loan  1.20  loan  1.20  loan  loan
excess was added  to expected  supply in  deter-  Soybeans  loan  loan  loan  loan
mining the need for reduced acreage  in the next  Reserve  ceiling  trigger:
period.  Corn  .......  1.45  loan  1.45  loan  1.45  loan  1.15  loan
An additional characteristic  of the model, de-  Wheat  .....  1.75  loan  1.75  loan  1.75  loan  1.15  loan
Soybeans  . 1.15  loan  1.15  loan  1.15  loan  1.15  loan signed to represent the actual decision  making
process  1 year ahead for acreage  diversion,  was  The  four alternatives  considered are given  in
the  trend  yield  and export  assumption.  As  the  Table  2.  Each alternative has been evaluated for
model  moved  forward  in time,  a  "look ahead"  two  different  levels  of  beginning  reserves.  In
price  considered  trend  yields  and  exports  in  general,  five  constraints  can be preselected  for
making an acreage diversion decision.  However,  policy  simulations  based on this  model.  These
when the model moved to the next year, actual  include:  (1)  beginning  reserve  levels,  (2)
levels of yields and estimated exports were used.  acreage  trigger price,  (3)  reserve  floor  trigger
In  some  cases  acreage  diversions  were  put  in  price,  (4)  reserve ceiling trigger price, and  (5)
place when in fact a drought year such as  1974  upper  reserve  bounds.  Of  the  four  program
actually  occurred.  Also,  in  some  cases  reserve  strategies  examined,  three  were  variations  of
levels were permitted to exceed the upper bound  the  current  supply  management  program.  The
levels  for the same  reason.  fourth involved  minimum intervention by gov-
ernment.
Program Strategies  The  acreage  trigger  price  for  each  of  the
Two  general  management  regimes  for  the  programs  examined  are  the  forward  price  ob-
buffer  stocks program were  investigated.  jective.  Estimated  future price below this level
1.  A minimum government intervention strat-  implied acreage  control for the next crop.  Gov-
egy was  examined where  the government  ernment  program  variables  were  selected  to
enters  stock  accumulation  to  provide  a  stimulate  the  necessary  program  participation
floor  price  at  the  loan rate  but  disposes  and corresponding acreage to satisfy the forward
of  accumulated  stocks  as  soon  as  price  price objective  or acreage  trigger price. Actual
recovers  to  115  percent of the  loan rate.  target price levels were used in every scenario.
A  paid  diversion  was  used  if  forecasted
price  1 year  ahead  was  below  loan  rate.  Comparisons of  Simulated Results
This  is  essentially  the  strategy  in  place  Results  of  these  simulations  point  out  the
before  the  1977 Act.  significance  and importance of the "silent rules
30Price  Price  Results obtained for each simulation are sum-
marized  in  tables  3  and  4.  Several  important
1Rserve75%  points are indicated by comparing these results:
supply management  strategies  I,  II,  and  III.
Reserve  ceiling
145%  Price  Price
Reserve  floor




placement  113%  Reserve  ceiling
145%
acreage  adjustment
Loan  100%  Loan  100%  Reserve  floor  113%  Release floor  120%
Loan  100%  Loan  100%
Quantity  Quantity  Acreage  Acreage
Corn  program  Wheat program  adjustment  0  adjustment 0
Quantity  Quantity
Figure  2.  Policy  I.  1977  Farm Bill-Corn  and  Wheat  Corn program  Wheat  program
Farmer Owned  Reserve  Program-Strategy I.
of the game"  in controlling supply management
programs.  Most  of the differences  between  the  Figure 4.  Policy III.  1981  Farm Bill-Corn and Wheat
simulated  program  costs  and  returns  were  as-  Farmer Owner Reserve  Program-Strategy III.
sociated  with  the  overall  price  objective  the  TABLE  3.  SUMMARY  OF GOVERNMENT  PROGRAM  OPTIONS  FOR CORN
administration  had  in  making  the  acreage  di-  OVER  THE  PERIOD  (1970-76)  AND  (1973-79)
version  decision.  The  1977  program,  Policy  I,  Market  Reserve  Govt.  Gross
utilized  a mid-range  price between  the release  Policy  price  level  cost  revenues
and  loan  rates  as  a  management  decision  pa-  .
rameter  and  attempted  to  adjust  reserves  and  $/Bu.  Mil.  b.  M.  d.  M. 
Zero Beginning  Reserves (1970-76) acreage  to produce an equilibrium at about  113Average  (1970-76)
percent  of the  loan,  Figure  2.  The  1981  pro-  I.  1977  1.79  139  425  10,194
gram,  Policy II,  leaned more  heavily on reserve  II.  1981  1.68  250  434  9,682
manipulation  as a  management  strategy,  Figure  III.  1981-I  1.47a  1,060
a 863a  9,096a
3.  For this reason,  the acreage adjustment price  IV. Minimum  1.68  98  698  9,825
was  set at  the loan rate.  The  1981-I,  Policy III  1  Billion Bu.  Beginning  Reserves  (1970-76)
option  goes  to an  extreme  in  the direction  of  Average  (1970-76)
reliance  on the reserve and only  removed  land  I.  1977  1.61  737  663  9,218
from production when the expected future price  II.  1981  1.53  810  671  8,818a
III.  1981-1  1.47a  1,608a  731  9,964
was zero,  Figure 4.  The last program,  Policy IV,  IV. Minimum  1.66  280  752a  9,964
conformed  to  the  pre-1977  management  re-
gime,  Figure  5.  CCC  stocks  were  obtained  to  Zero Beginning  Reserves  (173-79) Average  (1973-79)
support the loan and released  back on the mar-  I.  1977  2.93  ila  18,713
ket  at  115  percent  of  the  loan  rate.  Acreage  II.  1981  2.80  91  17,907
diversion  programs  were  used  to  support  the  III.  1981-I  2.44a  173a  35  15,651
a
loan rates;  hence,  acreage  adjustment occurs  in  IV.  Minimum  2.80  91  17,907
the  scenario  if  the  projected  future  price  is  1 Billion Bu.  Beginning  Reserves  (1973-79)
below the loan  rate.  Average  (1973-79)
I.  1977  2.61  54  438  16,937
Price  Price  II.  1981  2.48  54  411  16,178
III.  1981-I  2.24a  950
a 394  13,353a
Reserve  ceiling  175%  IV.  Minimum  2.39  22  747a  15,587
a Lowest price, highest  average reserve level, highest gov-
Reserve  ceiling  145%  ernment cost,  lowest  gross revenues.
Price  Price
Reserve  floor  120%
Reserve  ceiling  Reserve  ceiling  115%
Reserve  floor  113%  115%
Loan-floor  100%  Loan-floor  100%
Loan  100%  Loan  100%  acreage  adjustment  acreage  adjustment
acreage  adjustment  acreage  adjustment
Quantity  Quantity  Quantity  Quantity
Corn  program  Wheat  program  Corn  program  Wheat  program
Figure  3.  Policy  II.  1981  Farm Bill-Corn  and Wheat  Figure  5.  Policy  IV.  Minimum  Government-Corn,
Farmer Owned  Reserve  Program-Strategy II.  Soybeans,  and  Wheat  with  no  Farmer  Owned  Re-
serves-Minimum  Government  Program Strategy.
31TABLE  4. SUMMARY  OF  GOVERNMENT  PROGRAM  OPTIONS  FOR  average  reserve  level  was  737 million  bushels
WHEAT  OVER THE  PERIOD  (1970-76)  AND  (1973-79)
of corn.  From Table 4,  the average reserve level
Market  Reserve  Govern-  Gross  for wheat was  270 million bushels. The average ment
olicy  price  level  cot  revenues  commercial stock levels were 775 million bush-
$/bu.  mil.  bu.  mil. dol.  mil.  dol.  els of corn and  476 million bushels  of wheat.
Zero Beginning  Reserves  (1970-76)  Thus,  the  total  stock  averages  for  the  period
Average  (1970-76)  were about 1.5  billion bushels of corn and 750
I.  1977  2.74  7  752  5,719  million bushels  of wheat.
II.  1981  2.70  7  755  5,623
III.  1981-I  2.58a  - 764  5,365a
IV.  Minimum  2.70  - 766a  5,625  Minimum  Government  Strategy  (IV)
400  Mil.  Bu.  Beginning  Reserves  (1970-76)  . .
Average  (1970-76)  The  minimum  government  strategy  implied,
in most cases, that prices would have been lower
I.  1977  2.60  270  1,034  5,715  in low-price  years  and substantially  higher  in
II.  1981-I  2.57  283a 1,037  5563a  high-price years than those that occurred under III.  1981-1  2.50a  283 a  1,087a  5,535
a
IV.  Minimum  2.80  126  961  6,024  the  farmer-owned  reserve  strategies.  Reserves
Zero  Beginning  Reserves  (1973-79)  were  disposed  of rapidly,  and acreage  control
Average  (1973-79)  was utilized to support the loan rate. Therefore,
I.  1977  3.72  - 135  7,647  when  shortages  did  occur,  there was  less  top-





IV.  Minimum  3.58  - 82  7,331  son,  the  average  gross  farm  income  and  farm
400  Mil.  Bu.  Beginning  Reserves  (1973-79)  prices  compared  favorably  to  those  with  re-
Average  (1973-79)  serves  strategies.
I.  1977  3.27  10  461  6,967  The target price gives additional flexibility in
II.  1981  3.14  10  408  6,668  achieving  income  support.  However,  this  flex- III.  1981-I  2.76a  10  730a  6,097a
iv.  Minimum  3.05  - 474  6,502  ibility erodes if  the target price begins to  move
above the forward price objective  (acreage trig-
a Lowest price, highest average reserve level, highest gov-  ger)  Secificall  if  the  target  price  rides  up
ernment  cost,  lowest  gross revenues.
towards  the ceiling  price, this prevents the use
of the  farmer-owned  reserve  as  a  means  of re-
Land diversion  is a crucial  part of a balanced  ducing  deficiency  payments.
supply  management  program.  Tables  3  and  4  In summary,  these results tend to support the
provide  insight  for the expected  impact  of al-  notion that efficient operation  of a supply man-
ternative forward price objectives and diversion  agement  program  is  dependent  on  a very  bal-
strategies.  A balance between utilization  of the  anced  set  of  operation  rules.  These  rules  are
reserve  and  acreage  control  is  necessary  for  critically  dependent on four factors.
efficient  program  operation.
Program  strategy  1981-I  is  an  example  of  1.  The price band for free market operation,
management  by reserves  as opposed  to acreage  between  the  floor  and  ceiling  prices,
control.  In  most of the  scenarios  for  corn and  should  contain  the  long-run  average  cost
all  scenarios  for wheat,  this  strategy  gave  the  of production  and  take  account  of cross
lowest  farm  prices,  the  highest  reserves,  the  commodity substitution. Since these bands
highest  government  cost,  and  the lowest  gross  are  established  in  the  political  environ-
farm revenues.  ment,  this  responsibility  falls  to  policy-
A  forward  price  objective  or  acreage  trigger  makers.
price  in  a  mid-range  (Policy  I)  was  generally  2.  The forward price objective  (acreage  trig-
the  least  expensive  from  a  government  stand-  should tend toward the center of the
point,  required  less  reserves  and  had  higher  price band. Acreage  control becomes the
farm  prices  and higher  farm  gross  revenue.  As  most  viable  option  when  desired  stock
the acreage  trigger price  was  lowered,  the  so-  levels  are exceeded.
lution  moved  toward  less  land  diversion,  in-
creased  reserve  levels,  and  lower  farm  prices.  3.  The  capability  to  make  accurate  forward
Government  costs  increased  as  reserves  in-  supply  and  demand  estimates  at  least  2
creased, farm prices were lower, and deficiency  years  in the  future  is  essential.Continual
payments  were  higher.  optimism or pessimism  on  either the  de-
Levels of beginning  reserves  had a significant  mand  or  supply side  can severely  distort
impact on the average  level of reserves and the  efficient  program  management.
market price. The solution for 1 billion bushels  4.  Balanced operation is critically dependent
of  corn  and  400  million bushels  of wheat  be-  on program design for acreage control and
ginning  reserves  for  the  period  1970-76  most  reserve operations that can be readily con-
nearly reproduced  the average  stock objectives  verted  into  program  participation  with  a
of the  1977 program.  According to Table  3, the  high degree  of confidence.
32ECONOMIC  IMPLICATIONS  OF  THE  1982/  providing  feed grains  to the livestock  industry
83  REDUCED  ACREAGE  PROGRAM  FOR  at stable  prices,  this strategy produced  the  op-
CORN,  WHEAT  AND  SOYBEANS  posite effect.  Grain was  rationed  to the market
at prices normally experienced during drought
The  1982-83  reduced  acreage  program  for  years.  Third, an extremely  good crop year  fur-
crops,  announced  in January  of 1982,  required  ther complicated  the outcome  of the program.
a  10  percent  acreage  reduction  for feedgrains  This  simply  compounded  the  excess  supply
and  15  percent  for wheat  for  loan  and  target  problem  in a year where  program participation
price  protection.  Producers were  given the  re-  was very low. However,  this outcome does tend
duced acreage option with no cross compliance  to  reaffirm  the  importance  of aligning  the  pro-
constraint.  This program  did  not  offer  a  diver-  gram  around  a  mid-level  price objective  - nor-
sion  payment.  However,  the  incentive  for par-  mal crop years yield prices in the center  of the
ticipants  to  place  grain  in  the  farmer-owned  band,  poor years  at the  top and  good years  at
reserve  was  significantly  increased  over  the  the bottom.  Program  designs that do not assure
1981-82  program.  Participants  were  given  an  sufficient  participation simply increase  the risk
option of utilizing  the Commodity Credit  Cor-  of prices near the bottom side of the price band
poration  (CCC)  loan  of  $2.55  for  corn  and  in  normal  years,  compounding  the  down-side
$3.55  for  wheat.  Placing  grain  in  the  3-year  price risk with the corresponding  potential for
farmer-owned  reserve  provided  an  entry  loan  stock accumulation.  Fourth, final impacts have
price  of  $2.90  per bushel  for corn  and  $4.00  not  likely  occurred.  The  drought  of  1983  in
for wheat plus a 26.5  cents annual storage  pay-  conjunction  with  the PIK  program  resulted in
ment.  a  significant  decline  in  supplies.  Currently,
This  program  was  a  major  departure  from  farmer-held  reserves available  to the market are
previous designs  in that the reserve option con-  in  the  hands  of  a  small  percentage  of  1982
tained the  major economic  incentive  to attract  program participants.  Therefore,  strong poten-
program participation.  As  a result,  this strategy  tial  exists  for  these  producers  to  delay  sales
modified the rules for regulating the buffer stock  with a significant upside price correction in the
program.  This weaker  acreage  program  implies  latter part of the 1983/84 marketing year. Fifth,
a  lower forward  price objective  but the strong  for the first time in the history  of the program,
reserve incentive implies a large stock objective  total government expenditures are very near net
with a  high  floor  price,  farm  income  for  the  same  period.  This  is  an
unfortunate outcome in a political climate where
The  negotiation  process  leading  to this  pro-  total  budget  expenditures  will  be  more  seri-
gram  design was  conducted  in  an environment  ously scrutinized  in  the future.
of tight  near  term  budget  constraints  and  ex-
pectations  of continued  strength  in the  export
market.  Strong  acreage  control  programs  are
more expensive  in the near term than strategies  THE  1983/84  PAYMENT-IN-KIND
that rely  on price support  via manipulation  of  PROGRAM
the farmer-owned  reserve.  This combination  of
events  is  more likely to yield the modifications  The  1983-84  program  is  characterized  by a
in the program rules that were implemented  in  reduced acreage-paid  diversion strategy supple-
the 1982-83 program  (Lesher).  Most of the con-  mented with a payment-in-kind  (PIK)  program.
sequences  of these  modifications  have  already  Farmers  are  given  grain  in payment  for  idling
been  experienced.  First, utilization  of this  de-  PIK  acres.  Reports  by  the  USDA  indicate  that
sign departed rather significantly from previous  total  acreage  idled was  about  82  million.
programs,  leaving  very little  or no  observation  This substantial reduction in acreage is almost
data for sufficient evaluation  of program partic-  three  times  the  level  projected  by  an  analysis
ipation.  Second, after the feed  grain harvest  in  at the  University  of Missouri  in  the  Spring  of
the  fall  of  1982  and  in  the  winter  of  1983,  1983  (Womack).  The  models  did  not  include
participating  farmers  utilized  the reserve  at  an  and were  not  designed  to  estimate  effects  of a
unprecedented  rate thus shorting the market of  PIK  situation.  The  USDA  most  likely was  in  a
free  stocks.  Farm  price  of corn  moved  from  a  similar  position  and  clearly  was  surprised  by
low of $2.00/bu.  in October of 1982  to almost  the  final  level  of  participation.  Although  this
$  3.00 by April of 1983. Part of this price strength  strategy was aimed at realignment,  program  de-
may  have  been  attributable  to  the  announced  sign eminating  from  the  political  process  was
payment-in-kind  (PIK) program; however,  most  such a drastic  departure  from previous  designs
estimates  at  that  time  indicated  that,  with  or  that substantial  errors were made in estimating
without PIK, prices would have to reach release  participation.
level to provide sufficient grain late  in the crop  What combination  of events lead to the adop-
year.  Given concern  over maintaining  our com-  tion  of  a  PIK  program?  Several  reasons  have
petitive  advantage  in  the  export  market  and  been  given and  perhaps were best summarized
33TABLE  5.  PROGRAM  IMPACT  SUMMARY  1983/1984; CORN,  for corn conducted in May of 1983. The stronger
SOYBEANS,  WHEAT,  COTTON AND  RICE
paid  diversion  strategy  (RAP/PD/PD)  is  esti-
RAP/PD/  RAP/PD/  Differ-  mated to cost about  $3.5 billion  in contrast  to Item  PIKa  PDb  enceC about  $7.8 billion for the  PIK option (RAP/PD/
Planted  acres  (mil.  PIK).  Net  revenues  are  estimated  to  be  1.1
acres)  ..........................  212.7  230.2  (17.5)  billion  higher under the  PIK  options and  total
Gross  revenues  (mil.  reserves  are  estimated  to  be  about  1.0  billion
dol.)  ............................  53,461  53,610  (410)
Total  variable  Input  cost  bushels  lower.
(mil.  dol.)  ...................  24,521  27,602  (3,801)  Perhaps a  more  significant  point  to be  made
Net  returns  (mil.  dol.)  ...  28,474  27,365  1,109  by  this  particular  program  comparison  is  the
Government  cost  (mil.
dol.)  ............................  14,741  7,124  7,617  differential program cost. It would be most ironic
for the  agricultural  sector  to  be  saddled  with aReduced  acreage,  Paid Diversion,  Payment In  Kind Pro-  for  t  agricultural  sector  to  be  saddled  with
gram  announced  in January  1983  for  1983  crop year.  additional  budget  restraints  in  the  future  be-
bReduced  acreage,  Paid Diversion,  10  percent additional  cause  of  the  cost  of  the  PIK  program.  This
voluntary  paid  diversion.  analysis  suggests  that  the  rather  tight  fisted
budget constraint by Congress and the  Office of
by Lesher when  he  indicated  that the political  Management  and Budget contribute to  this out-
process was  in  no mood  to further  aggravate  a  come. Stated another way, the PIK program most
record  federal  deficit,  hence  precluding  tradi-  likely exceeded  the mark necessary for program
tional methods to reduce  production. Although  realignment.  Part of this overkill can be  attrib-
the agricultural  sector has  entered  a period  of  uted to the inability  of predicting with reason-
potential  excess  supply,  the  near  term  budget  able  accuracy  farmer  participation  in  this
constraint  looms high on the horizon  as a major  program  design.
obstacle  in obtaining  sufficient up front monies  A  similar case  can be  made  for wheat,  Table
to effectively  control  the  supply side.  7.  Estimated  government  cost  is  about  $2.6
Unfortunately,  a  tight  budget  environment  billion  higher under the  PIK option;  however,
was  further  complicated  by  the  desire  for  a  farmer net revenues are only $220 million lower.
"quick  fix."  This type  of climate  did not allow  Table  8 reflects the cross impact on the soybean
sufficient time to analyze  the total ramifications  industry  under the  different  program  options.
of this program  relative  to alternative  designs.  The  design  of the  PIK program  supports  the
Analyses  conducted  by the  modeling  unit at  notion of a supply management strategy in that
the University of Missouri after the March  1983  a strong acreage  control program  was necessary
intentions  report  by the  USDA indicated  that  a  for realignment around forward price and stock
stronger paid diversion strategy would have  re-  objectives.  The most serious departure  from the
duced program cost  by approximately  one-half  more  balanced  set  of rules  is  the  formulation
for corn,  soybeans,  wheat,  cotton  and  rice,  un-  of program design that could not easily be eval-
der a normal weather scenario, Table  5.  Reserve  uated before the fact.  Our ex post analysis  sug-
levels,  however,  would  have  remained  signifi-  gests  options  that  would  have  been  less
cantly  higher,  requiring  a  sequence  of  step-  expensive  to  the government  and  yielded sim-
down years to reach more  reasonable  stock lev-  ilar net returns  to farmers.  The  trade-off under
els. Table  6 reflects the normal weather scenario  a  stronger  paid  diversion  option  would  have
TABLE  6.  SUMMARY  OF PROGRAM  OPTIONS  FOR  CORN,  1983/1984
Total
variable Acres  Reserves  variable Gross  production  Net  Partici-
Program  Planted  Harvested  Price  Free  CCC  FOR  revenue  costa  revenues  pation
(mil.)  (mil.)  ($/bu.)  (mil.  bu.)  (mil.  bu.)  (mil.  bu.)  (mil. $)  (mil.  $)  (mil. $)  %
RAP/PDb ..........  79.0  69.0  2.57  452  475  2,200  20,491  12,409  8,082  50
RAP/PD/PIKC  ...  58.8  51.0  2.71  493  304  1,250  22,421  9,806  12,615  81
RAP/PD/PDd  ....  74.0  64.0  2.88  469  479  2,000  23,198  11,740  11,457  60
Government  costs
Deficiency  Diversion  PIK  Othere  Total
............  ..  .........  .. ...  ........................  m il.  d o  l.  ...........................................
RAP/PD  ........................................................  578  516  - 1,525  2,618
RAP/PD/PIK  .................................................  714  1,030  4,443  1,643  7,830
RAP/PD/PD  ..................................................  308  1,759  1,469  3,536
a Variable  non-land costs  of production  were  $150  per  planted acre  and  $20  per conservation  acre.
b Reduced  acreage-paid  diversion program announced  in 1982  for  1983 program  is  15-05  for wheat and  10-10 for corn.
c Reduced  acreage-paid  diversion  program  with  PIK  option.
d Reduced  acreage-rpaid  diversion  program  with  an  additional  10  percent  voluntary  paid diversion;  i.e.,  15-05-10  for
wheat and  10-10-10  for  corn.
e Included  deferred  interest  and  storage  costs.
34TABLE  7.  SUMMARY  OF  PROGRAM  OPTIONS  FOR  WHEAT,  1983/1984
Total
Acres  Reserves  variable Gross  production  Net  Partici- Program  Planted  Harvested  Price  Free  CCC  FOR  revenue  cost  revenues  pation
(mil.)  (mil.)  ($/bu.)  (mil.  bu.)  (mil.  bu.)  (mil.  bu.)  (mil.  5)  (mil.  $)a  (mil.  $)  %
RAP/PD
b ..........  83.5  74.0  3.71  315  187  1,000  10,933  7,279  3,653  50 RAP/PD/PIKC  ...  77.4  63.0  3.68  325  480  592  11,843  6,165  5,678  85 RAP/PD/PDd  ....  76.0  67.0  3.90  366  187  800  11,330  6,780  5,898  70
Government  costs
Deficiency  Diversion  PIK  Othere  Total
......................................................  ...  . . ...........
RAP/PD  ........................................................  780  202  782  1,994 RAP/PD/PIK  ........  956  344  1,793  1,805  5,007 RAP/PD/PD  ..................................................  696  829  715  2,484
a Variable non-land  costs  of production  were  $85  per planted acre,  $20 per conservation  acre,  and  $50  per PIK acre  on winter wheat.
b Reduced acreage-paid  diversion  program announced  in  1982  for 1983  program  is  15-05  for wheat and  10-10 for corn. c Reduced  acreage-paid  diversion  program  with  PIK option.
dReduced  acreage-paid  diversion  program  with  an  additional  10  percent  voluntary  paid  diversion;  i.e.,  15-05-10  for wheat  and  10-10-10  for corn.
e  Included  deferred  interest  and storage  costs.
been  more  stocks  in  hand,  a  somewhat  more  is  defaulted  at the  end  of the reserve  contract
desirable situation given the drought conditions  period.
of  1983.  Although  tables  5  though  8  have  not
been updated for drought conditions,  it is fairly  THE  1984-85  REDUCED  ACREAGE
obvious  that  government  expenses  under  the  PROGRAM
stronger  paid  diversion  option  would  be  re-  Policy issues  behind  the  formulation  of the duced because of reserve paybacks and reduced  1984-85  crop  program  centered  around  com-
deficiency  payments.  parative  advantage  in world  trade and the level
It  should be  noted  that some  analysts  argue  of escalating target prices. As a result, loan rates
that the  PIK option would cost  less in the long  were lowered for some commodities.  However,
run,  since  the  grain  would  otherwise  be  de-  the  target  price  issue  has  not been  resolved.
faulted at the end of the 3-year contract.  Present  These  levels  of target price  support precluded
value analysis tends to support this notion.  How-  the  option  of a  zero reduced  acreage  program
ever,  this scenario  is  realized  only if the grain  for coarse  grains and  has resulted in a program
TABLE  8.  SUMMARY  OF  PROGRAM  OPTIONS  FOR  SOYBEANS  1983/1984
Total
Acres  Reserves  variable Gross  productiona Net  Partici- Planted  Harvested  Price  Free  CCC  FOR  revenue  cost  revenues  pation
(mil.)  (mil.)  ($/bu.)  (mil.  bu.)  (mil.  bu.)  (mil.  $)  (mil.  $)  (mil.  $)  %
RAP/PDb..........  70.0  69.0  5.72  192  75  - 12,275  5,600  6,675  - RAP/PD/PIKC  ...  65.8  64.8  6.40  203  50  - 13,274  5,264  7,808  RAP/PD/PDd  ....  68.0  67.0  6.36  185  50  - 13,254  5,440  7,814
Government  costs
CCC sales  Diversion  PIK  Othere  Total
....................................................mil.  dol .....................................................
RAP/PD  ........................................................  (132.50)  - - 56  76.50 RAP/PD/PIK  .................................................  (265.00)  57  208.00 RAP/PD/PD  ....................  (265.00)  - 40  255.80
a Variable  non-land  cost  of production  is  $80 per planted  acre.
b Reduced  acreage-paid  diversion program  announced  in  1982 for  1983  program  is  15-05  for wheat  and  10-10  for corn.
c  Reduced  acreage-paid  diversion  program  with  PIK option.
d Reduced  acreage--paid  diversion  program  with  an  additional  10 percent  voluntary paid  diversion;  i.e.,  15-05-10  for wheat  and  10-10-10  for  corn.
e  Included  deferred  interest  and storage  costs.
35for  wheat that  does  not  seem  to be  attractive  to  longer  term  path.  The  question  to  be  an-
to  producers.  swered is whether the supply management pro-
Target  prices  have reached  a  level  that sub-  gram design is adequate to meet this economic-
stantially  constrain  the  Secretary  in  managing  political  environment.  The  answer lies  in  two
the  farm  program.  A zero reduced  acreage  op-  areas. First,  the operation  of the program by all
tion  for  feed  grains  would  have  exposed  the  the players  in the  political  environment  must
administration for a crop program cost of around  be clearly understood with regard to a balanced
$4  million  under  a  normal  weather  scenario.  set of rules governing operation.  Second, nearer
This  rather  significant  government  cost  expo-  term budget constraints  must be  examined rel-
sure  is  a  major  constraint  in  program  design.  ative  to  longer  run  government  budget  expo-
1984  in conjunction with  extremely  low feed-  Even  if the  risk of an  additional  short  crop  in
grains  stocks  implied  no  constraints  on  feed-  sure. If this does not occur, experience  suggests
grain  production,  that  option  is  precluded  that a  different  program strategy  is  warranted.
because  of budget  exposure.  The  current  environment  of excess  supplies,
Exactly  the  opposite  situation  has  occurred  budget  constraints  and  high  target  prices  for
for wheat.  High target  price exposure  resulted  several commodities  has reduced the necessary
in a 30 percent reduced acreage and 20 percent  flexibility  for efficient management  of the pro-
PIK  program participation.  This program  strat-  grams.  This  conclusion  is  fairly  evident  from
egy  is still likely to result  in  an excess  supply  the  design  and  conseuences  of the  1982-83
imbalance  for 1984-85  with wheat prices mov-  and  1983-84  programs.  Both  options  were
ing at  or near the  loan rate.  In this event  gov-  strongly  conditioned  on  meeting  guideline
ernment  controlled  stocks  are  very  likely  to  budget constraints,  apparently precluding more
increase  with  corresponding  longer  term  gov-  traditional  options,  thus  subjecting  program
ernment  cost exposure.  administration  to more risky options. Unless the
Thus,  a more  salient  factor that removes  the  Secretary  is  given more  flexibility  in managing
1984-85  program  design  away from  the  more  his  budget  and programs,  the  supply manage-
balanced  supply management  objectives  is  the  ment  strategy  is  doomed  to  failure.  Supplies
mandated  target  price  moving  near  the top  of  cannot  be  effectively  controlled.  Hence,  the
the  price band.  Exposure  of government  costs  most  likely  price  over  time  is  the  loan  rate
preclude  options that may be  more  feasible  in  with  the  potential  for  significant  stock  accu-
the  current  environment.  An  additional  factor  mulation.  In the  longer  term  this  could  mean
somewhat  related  to  this  situation  is  program  another  major  modification  similar  to  PIK.  If
base  acreage.  Currently  about 92  million acres  this  buffer stock program  design  is  maintained
are  in the wheat program;  however,  only about  in the  current  budget  environment,  it  may be
78  to  80  million  are  necessary  for  a  supply-  necessary  to legislate  mandatory  diversion  pro-
demand balance.  This excess  capacity,  if main-  grams  after  reserves  ach  undesirable  levels.
tained  in  the  base,  subjects  program  cost  for  Otherwise,  a  more  minimal  government  inter-
the  wheat program  alone  to  an added  $1.5  to  vention program containing fewer options will
$2.0  billion  per year.  be  necessary.
On  the  positive  side,  this  analysis  does  in-
dicate that the focus for  1985 will be on more ISSUES  FOR THE  1985  FARM  BILL
economical methods of acreage control and pro-
In  order  that  we  monitor  the  agricultural  grams that will enhance  export expansion.  Sup-
sector  on  a  continuous  basis,  the  agricultural  ply controls will run the gamut from mandatory
modeling  unit  at the University  of Missouri  in  to no government  programs.  Based on previous
conjunction  with  Wharton  Econometrics  Fore-  program  popularity with farmers,  some type of
casting  Associates  conducts  a  longer  term  out-  voluntary program  is  likely. If so, considerable
look  semiannually  (Wharton).  This  exercise,  flexibility must be built in to accommodate  the
completed  in  the  later  part  of  1983  suggests  rather wide swings that have occurred in supply
the potential for excess  supplies in  the face  of  and demand since the early 1970's. Target prices
sluggish  export  demand with  rather  significant  and loan rates should reflect longer run average
budget  exposure.  This forecast  is  conditioned  costs of regions with the comparative advantage.
on  a  moderate  upturn  in  domestic  and foreign  Target  prices  must be  maintained  at  or below
economies,  and slight declines  in interest  rates  the center of the desired price band. Base acreage
and the value of the dollar. These general econ-  should  reflect  expected  domestic  and  foreign
omy  forecasts  were  obtained  from  Wharton  demand.  Excess  base  area  represents  potential
Econometrics  in  December  of  1983.  Also  im-  government  treasury  exposure  and  encourages
plicit  is  normal  weather  in  the  domestic  and  producers  to  maintain  marginal  land  in  pro-
foreign  markets.  duction.
Given  that  the  chance  of  good  to  normal  Ideally,  excess  base  area offers  the opportu-
weather  is  greater  than  poor,  this  set  of  pro-  nity  for  conservation  strategies.  Also,  experi-
jections may reflect the more likely intermediate  ence with the bid option under the PIK program
36suggests that this strategy should be considered  supplies.  Cartel  and  marketing  boards  will be
in obtaining desired  acreage  in a set aside year.  considered.  Given the previous unpopularity of
This strategy precludes a blanket diversion  pay-  mandatory  programs  in  the  major  crop  grain
ment on all lands  and places the administration  area,  it  is  unlikely  that  this  option  will  be
in  a  position  of stronger  control  over  the  un-  adopted  in  the near term.
certainty  of  program  participation  and  cost.  Finally,  this research  is  another indication  of
Counties with  erodible  lands could  be  treated  the  necessity  for  consideration  of  longer  run
accordingly.  implications  of farm  program  design.  Alterna-
Export  program  options  are  also  being  de-  tive  strategies  must  be  evaluated  around  the
bated,  ranging  from  free-market  to  marketing  uncertainties of future supply and demand. This
boards  and  cartel  strategies.  Combined  with  may necessitate the evaluation of several  "what
these  options  is  the  potential  for  significant  c 
trade subsidies  or a trade war.  If the more free  enarios  efore a stamp
market  strategy is  maintained,  considerable  at-  given.  The  lessen  of  the  last  4  years  simply
tention will be given to the bottom side support  reaffirms  the  condition  of flexibility  in  farm
price that  maintains  comparative  advantage  in  program options.  If the buffer  stock strategy is
world  trade.  maintained,  these  flexibilities  must  allow  for
It will be necessary  to ascertain whether loan  cross-commodity  interaction relative to the un-
rates are stifling exports and stimulating foreign  derlying  rules for efficient  program  operation.
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